In what sense are you the same person today that you were when you were ten?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61173/radgv527Keywords:
identity, continuity, memory, perception evolutionAbstract
This analysis explores the relationship between our present selves and our ten-year-old selves, emphasizing the shared ontological basis that connects us over time while acknowledging the fluidity of personal identity. Although traits and characteristics may persist, they are often subject to reinterpretation due to the subjective workings of memory and perception. These distortions can lead to a divergence from our past selves, driving the evolution of identity in new directions. While our current identity is undeniably influenced by early experiences, it is not fixed; it continuously evolves through the dynamic nature of memory. This process highlights the complexity of self-continuity, where identity is shaped by a delicate balance between the enduring elements of our past and the transformative forces of subjective experience. Ultimately, our identity is a fluid construct, grounded in the past yet adaptable, capable of evolving in response to both internal and external influences.References
[1] Bader, Ralf, 2013, !Towards a Hyperintensional Theory of Intrinsicality”, Journal of Philosophy, 110: 525–563. (Scholar”
[2] Teroni, Fabrice, 2014, !The Epistemological Disunity of Memory”, in Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Vol. 2, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 183–202. doi:10.1007/978-3-319- 05146-8_12
[3] Locke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975.
[4] Hoerl, Christoph, –––, 2007, Episodic Memory, Autobiographical Memory, Narrative: On Three Key Notions in Current Approaches to Memory Development”, Philosophical Psychology, 20(5): 621– 640. doi:10.1080/09515080701537988
[5] Lin, Martin, 2005, ”Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(2): 243–268. doi: 10.1080/00455091.2005.10716589
[6] Schechtman, 2011, “Memory and Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 153(1): 65–79. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9645-6
[7] Goldie, Peter, 2012, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230730.001.0001
[8] Hume, David, [1739] 2011, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[9] Buford, Christopher, 2009, !Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi- Memory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(3): 465–478. doi:10.1080/00048400802257747 Roache 2006; Shoemaker 1970
[10] Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[11] Shoemaker, Sydney, 1970, “Persons and Their Pasts”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4): 269–285.
[12] Locke, John, 1689, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Book II, Chapter XXVII, “Of Identity and Diversity”.
[13] Lewis, David, 1976, “Survival and Identity”, in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press, pp. 17-40.
[14] Shoemaker, Sydney, 1970, “Persons and Their Pasts”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4): 269–285.
[15] Roache, Rebecca, 2006, “A Defence of Quasi-Memory”, Philosophy, 81(02): 323– 355. doi:10.1017/S0031819106316075
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 by the authors.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
