Analysis of the cause, harm and optimization of “too much democracy”

Authors

  • Sijia Ye

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61173/q43rtn87

Keywords:

excessive democracy, causes, inefficiency, political apathy, deliberate democracy

Abstract

“Too much democracy” refers to an excess of political procedures, institutions, and information. It has a historical background, but it actually leads to worse governance and poses significant challenges to global democratic systems. The reasons for excessive democracy include the inherent nature of democracy itself and the impure political motives of politicians participating in democratic activities. While excessive democracy can improve transparency and accountability, it can lead to inefficient decision-making, political gridlock and economic losses. Political apathy,  which contributes to populism and political polarization, can also be attributed to excessive democracy. Deliberate democracy, as a new trend in numerous democratic countries, does not address the core problems of “too much democracy” and is not a long-term solution. This paper believes that the direction of efforts should be to continuously improve the clarity and efficiency of democratic principles.

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Published

2024-10-29