Future Development of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Tacit Knowledge

Authors

  • Zixuan Zhao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61173/8hbby137

Keywords:

Tacit knowledge, Explicit knowledge, Artificial intelligence, Intentionality

Abstract

The “Chinese Room Argument” is a thought experiment proposed by American philosopher John Searle in 1980. It refutes the claim that computer programs as symbolic representation systems can generate semantic understanding by arguing that artificial intelligence cannot express intentionality. In 1982, Australian philosopher Frank Jackson introduced the “Knowledge Argument,” which questions the physicalism reducibility perspective by examining the concept of qualia. From the analysis of these two thought experiments, it can be concluded that the knowledge of computer programming and its machine simulation cannot truly understand the meaning understood by biological intelligence, and that meaning contains the content of tacit knowledge, so even the most complete artificial intelligence system still lacks the intrinsic, non-physical, and intimate properties that are characteristic of biological intelligence. It is these properties that make up the important difference between biological intelligence and artificial intelligence. This paper discusses how three tacit knowledge forms, relational, physical and collective, affect the development of artificial intelligence, and tries to explore a new direction for the development of artificial intelligence in the future.

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Published

2024-10-29